10 Nov October 2026 Supreme Court Round Up
After a few months with no family law cases from the Kentucky Supreme Court, the Supremes tackle a divorce case and, for the most part, get it right. Here’s what you need to know.
Marcia Dall v. Roger Dall, 2025-SC-0077
Every Kentucky Family Court judge should read this one. The same goes for any lawyer preparing proposed findings in a divorce involving property or maintenance. The Supremes deliver three important reminders: equal division is not presumed, moving out does not stop the accumulation of marital property, and maintenance requires findings about more than employability. The estate here approached $20 million, but the same rules apply when the parties fight over a retirement account and a used pickup, although truck appellate litigation is rare.
Marcia and Roger were married for thirty-eight years. Both began with careers, but repeated moves advanced Marcia’s professional success while interrupting Roger’s employment. In 2002, Roger left the workforce and became a stay-at-home father. Marcia eventually became Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice President of Churchill Downs, earning an $800,000 base salary plus additional compensation.
By the time they separated in February 2020, their marital estate was worth approximately $11.9 million. By trial, it had grown to approximately $19.2 million. That is quite a separation bonus—and quite an incentive to argue about who gets it.
The case began in Jefferson County Family Court, where Judge Gatewood divided the marital property equally and awarded Roger $15,000 in monthly maintenance until Marcia turned 65 or retired, whichever came later. The Court of Appeals largely approved those decisions. The Supreme Court did not.
Equal can be equitable, but it is not automatic.
The first problem was the Family Court’s explanation for dividing the property equally. The court reasoned that the legislature intended for spouses who operated as a functioning marital unit to leave the marriage in equal financial positions. Understandable sentiment. Unfortunately, that is not what KRS 403.190 says.
The statute requires division in “just proportions” after considering relevant factors, including each spouse’s contributions, the property awarded to each, the marriage’s duration, and the parties’ economic circumstances. There is no presumption favoring fifty-fifty—even after a long marriage. Relying on Thielmeier v. Thielmeier, 664 S.W.3d 563, 574 (Ky. 2022), the Court emphasized that merely citing the statute is insufficient: the findings must demonstrate that the judge actually considered its factors.
The majority concluded that the mistaken presumption drove the result. It goes back for a fresh analysis. The Court did not hold that Marcia deserves sixty percent or that an equal division would necessarily be wrong. An equal division remains available if the evidence and statutory analysis support it.
Moving out does not close the marital books.
Marcia also challenged Roger’s share of the substantial wealth accumulated after separation. Here, the Court drew an important distinction between classifying property and dividing it. Physical separation does not create a legal separation, and these assets remained marital unless a statutory exception applies.
But marital classification does not dictate an equal allocation. The court must still apply KRS 403.190 to determine each spouse’s share.
Marcia relied on Shively and Thielmeier to argue that Roger needed to show continuing contributions that supported her acquisition of post-separation assets. The Supremes rejected that reading. In Thielmeier, the Family Court excluded a wife from sharing in post-separation retirement contributions even though its own findings established that her care for the parties’ child enabled her husband to work and fund the account. The problem was inconsistent findings; the decision did not make continuing contributions the controlling factor in every case.
Roger’s earlier sacrifices and homemaking could have helped position Marcia to earn substantial compensation years later. Those contributions remain relevant, along with the other statutory factors. Neither Shively nor Thielmeier creates a categorical rule that the wage earner keeps everything earned after moving day.
Maintenance has an entrance requirement.
The maintenance award also returns for reconsideration. Before deciding how much maintenance to award or how long it should last, the court must determine whether the requesting spouse qualifies under KRS 403.200(1).
Roger’s age and twenty-year absence from the workforce addressed his ability to support himself through appropriate employment. They did not answer whether the substantial property awarded to him could meet his reasonable needs. Both questions required findings. A conclusion that someone cannot realistically return to work does not finish the maintenance analysis.
The Dissent
Justice Thompson, joined by Justice Keller, would have affirmed. He believed the Family Court understood its obligation to divide the estate equitably and that its references to legislative intent were surplusage. Justice Thompson also emphasized the accessibility of the retirement assets when defending maintenance and urged prompt resolution on remand. After years of litigation and substantial legal fees, that concern has real merit. Family court litigation shouldn’t take forever, but it didn’t carry the day in this case.
To be published. http://opinions.kycourts.net/sc/2025-SC-0077-DG.pdf
A Little Something for Our Criminal Law Friends
We typically focus on family law issues. But we thought we could give our criminal defense buds a little belated treats and tricks for the October Round Up. Final tally this month is Cops 2, Robbers 1. Here are the specifics.
J.S. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2024-SC-0308-DG
After nearly twenty crime-free years and successful completion of Drug Court, J.S. gets another chance at expungement. Justice Thompson’s opinion holds that the retroactive 2023 expansion of felony-expungement eligibility applies while J.S.’s case remains pending on appeal. The Court offers a welcome reminder that second chances are still possible. To be published.
Christopher Jackson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2024-SC-0538-MR
Kentucky’s vehicular-homicide statue, “Lily’s Law,” does not put a ceiling on the charge when an intoxicated driver causes a death. Wanton murder remains available when the evidence establishes its additional elements. Justice Nickell’s opinion affirms Jackson’s convictions and thirty-five-year sentence after Jackson drove approximately ninety-nine miles per hour in a forty-five-mile-per-hour zone before a fatal collision. To be published.
Gelin Omar Guevara v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2025-SC-0059-MR
Justice Keller’s opinion affirms Guevara’s convictions and life sentence, with a useful evidentiary reminder for practitioners on both sides of the courthouse: the Cabinet’s conclusion that abuse was “unsubstantiated” was inadmissible, just as its substantiation conclusions can be. Bonus holding: the Court also found harmless a juror’s apparent encouragement of a child witness during trial. A weird holding, if you ask the Round Up editorial board. To be published.
Thanks for reading! Click here to read last month’s Supreme Court Round Up.
Cover Photo by Taylor Brandon on Unsplash.