11 Nov November 6 Round Up: Round Up Road Trip

A stampede of family court cases from the KY Court of Appeals. Something for everyone this week. This week, cases came from all around the Commonwealth. So saddle up and let’s take a Round Up Road Trip.

Danielle Hill v. Diane Tye, 2025-CA-1457

We start this week in Lexington, where a mom representing herself on appeal got a partial reversal by pointing to something already in the record. It was the judge’s own order.

Diane had sole custody of her grandson under a 2019 North Carolina order. After Diane and the child moved to Kentucky, the child’s mother, Danielle, asked for more time with her son and eventually sought birthdays, holidays, and summer visits. Two FOCs (Friends of the Court) recommended keeping the existing arrangement. After a hearing that lasted more than three hours, Judge Yahr found that more visitation would not serve the child’s best interests. Diane had been managing his autism-related care, Danielle had yet to complete all the required assessments, and the court had concerns about unsupervised visits in North Carolina. Chief Judge Thompson, joined by Judges Easton and Eckerle, left the visitation ruling in place.

The contempt motions are where things get interesting. Judge Yahr found that Diane violated an order requiring the two women to treat each other respectfully. Calling Danielle “dumb” and “stupid” apparently did little to advance that objective. The judge warned Diane to comply going forward and reasons that a financial penalty would ultimately take resources away from the child. The Court of Appeals held that the judge acted within her discretion and affirmed that portion of the order.

Then came the medical providers. Danielle said Diane was interfering with her ability to speak with the providers directly. Judge Yahr looked to a June 2022 order, which gave Danielle access to records and required that she be kept informed. Fair enough, as far as that order went. But there was another order. On March 3, 2023, the court expressly allowed Danielle to communicate directly with her son’s medical providers. So, Danielle was in compliance with the judge’s own order. That sent the contempt issue back to Fayette County Family Court to decide whether Diane interfered and whether contempt is warranted. We think that Danielle is not in contempt on this one. Stay tuned.

Unreported. http://opinions.kycourts.net/COA/2025-CA-001457.PDF

Ashour Hamid v. Ashmad Hamid and Abdalramhan Hamid, 2025-CA-1492

Our next stop is Louisville, where a dispute that began in Jefferson County Family Court wound up before Jefferson Circuit Judge Sarah Clay. Ashour had a deed naming him as the sole grantee of the family home. His two adult songs had domestic violence order requiring Ashour to stay 500 feet away from the home. You can see the problem from at least 500 feet away.

After his wife, Leila, died, Ashour asked the Family Court to give him possession of the home. The Family Court denied the motion, pointing to the existing DVOs and a probate issue involving Leila’s will. Ashour let that ruling stand and filed a separate suit in Circuit Court, asking for an injunction requiring his sons to move out and allowing him to move back in. The sons claimed Leila had a marital interest in the home that she intended them to inherit. Judge Clay dismissed the suit with prejudice.

Judge Easton, joined by Chief Judge Thompson and Judge Eckerle, saw two problems. First, the request to make the sons vacate sounded like a forcible detainer action, which belongs in District Court if a landlord-tenant relationship exists. The record was too thin to establish that relationship with certainty. The second problem was enough on its own. Giving Ashour possession would necessarily interfere with Family Court’s stay-away orders. Calling the requested relief an injunction did nothing to shorten the distance.

Ashour did a win a change in two words. The appellate court dismissed without prejudice because a jurisdictional dismissal leaves the merits open. A properly pleaded property claimed may still have a home, possibly in contested probate proceedings. And the Family Court can revisit the DVO’s residence restrictions upon a showing of changed circumstances.

Unreported. http://opinions.kycourts.net/COA/2025-CA-001492.PDF

Brittany Gibson v. Tyler Gibson, 2025-CA-1493

When Brittany and Tyler divorced in 2019, they got joint custody of their daughter. Brittany was the primary residential parent, and Tyler had alternating weekends plus summer and holiday time. Geography drove the uneven split. Once Tyler moved to the same town as his daughter, he asked for equal time. Judge Joyner heard from both parents, a Friend of the Court, and the child’s therapist, then granted Tyler’s motion.

In this parenting schedule case, Tyler’s move from Somerset to London, KY, addressed the driving issues. However, the judge’s order merited a reversal, with a return trip to Laurel County Family Court due to a legal error.

Judge Joyner expressly applied the statutory presumption favoring equal parenting time and found that neither party had offered enough evidence to rebut it. Chief Judge Thompson, joined by Judges Allison Jones and Karem, pointed to Layman v. Bohanon, 599 S.W.3d 423 (Ky. 2020). When the motion seeks to change an existing timesharing schedule, KRS 403.320 governs. The questions is whether the proposed change serves this child’s best interests. The equal-time presumption in the custody statutes does not apply.

The panel acknowledged that Judge Joyner considered the best-interest factors. But the presumption shaped how he weighed them, and the panel couldn’t tell what schedule he would have chosen without it. On remand, equal time is still on the table, along with a smaller increase or a more gradual transition.

Unpublished. http://opinions.kycourts.net/COA/2025-CA-001493.PDF

Billie West v. Abigail Harbin, 2025-CA-1613

We’re off to Bowling Green, where several encounters at Chuck E. Cheese turned into a stalking case. The detail that decides the appeal, though, is a date on the calendar.

Abigail worked at the restaurant arcade. She testified that Billie came in several times over a short stretch, stared at her during one visit, and screamed and cursed at her grandmother during another. Abigail also said she heard Billie talking about guns and was frightened enough to ask to leave work early. Billie said her family had a pass and regularly went their with their child, who has special needs. Billie also testified that she had never communicated with Abigail. Judge Wilson granted Abigail an interpersonal protective order (IPO) based on stalking.

Judge L. Jones, joined by Judges Caldwell and Karem, reversed. Under the law that governed this 2025 order, Abigail had to prove both a qualifying course of conduct and an explicit or implicit threat intended to put her in reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or death. The threat was the missing piece. The panel found no evidence that Billie even spoke to Abigail, and the testimony about guns supplied no context from which the court could infer a threat. The panel sent the case back with instructions to dismiss the petition.

And for the RAP watchers, Abigail filed no brief, and Billie’s brief omitted the required preservation statement. The panel reached the merits anyway, but it reminded Billie’s counsel, that it warned him about the same omission in Hampton. A Westlaw citation to your previous warning is a fairly good sign that the court has run out of hints. Ouch.

Unreported. http://opinions.kycourts.net/COA/2025-CA-001613.PDF

Stephen Shields v. Tasha Robinson, 2026-CA-0069

Right on the heels of West, we get another stalking appeal with a different result. This one went from repeated texts to the doorbell camera to a car chase down Route 16.

Tasha testified that when she and Stephen lived together, he punched walls, damaged her freezer, and once punched a hole through a door during an argument. After the breakup, the calls and texts kept coming. When she blocked him, he switched to email. He showed up at her home repeatedly after she told him he wasn’t welcome. One morning, Tasha left for work, thinking he’d gone. Instead, she testified that he was waiting nearby in his car, followed her onto Route 16, wove through traffic, and yelled through his window that he would ruin her life and “wreck” her.

Stephen admitted punching holes in walls earlier in their relationship and acknowledge that he had sometimes been emotionally abusive. He argued that he had never raised a hand to Tasha and that his threats concerned her job and reputation. Judge Dusing credited Tasha’s testimony and entered a three-year domestic violence order, with detailed findings in a separate calendar order.

Judge Taylor, joined by Judges Cetrulo and McNeill, affirmed on two grounds. First, the escalating pattern supported an implicit threat under the stalking law that governed the 2025 order. The Family Court found mental distress, and the panel treated its omission of the word “substantial” as harmless because the testimony established the degree of distress. Second, the pursuit and confrontation on Route 16 supported the separate finding that Stephen had put Tasha in fear of imminent physical injury. As the panel explained through Hohman v. Dery, a court can find that someone inflicted that fear even when no physical injury occurred.

And yes, the Rules of Appellate Procedure make another appearance. Stephen’s brief omitted the required preservation statements. Tasha filed no brief. The panel reviewed the merits anyway, affirmed the DVO, and did not impose any financial penalties.

Unreported. http://opinions.kycourts.net/COA/2026-CA-000069.PDF

Stephen Hensley v. Debra Hensley, 2026-CA-0116

Stephen Hensley started out owing $5,330 a month in maintenance. By the time he got to the Court of Appeals, he owed $1,000 a month. He wanted one more reduction, preferably to a nice round zero.

Stephen and Debra separated after more than 28 years of marriage and settled everything in their divorce except maintenance, which is Kentucky’s term for alimony. The Family Court awarded Debra permanent maintenance, and arrears began piling up almost immediately. The court issued two contempt findings along the way. At the first, Stephen claimed he had liquidated a substantial asset and gambled away hundreds of thousands of dollars in Las Vegas before moving to Mexico. The Family Court noted that he supplied no proof of the losses. Even in Vegas, the receipts would have helped.

In 2019, the parties agreed to reduce maintenance to $2,000 a month, with another $875 toward the arrears. Their agreed order allowed modification under KRS Chapter 403 and specified that maintenance would end upon Debra’s death, remarriage, or cohabitation as if married. In 2025, Stephen moved to terminate. Judge Webb found a significant and continuing change in circumstances and cut the monthly obligation in half. Stephen appealed, arguing that Debra was now better off financially and that continued payments were unfair.

Judge Easton, joined by Chief Judge Thompson and Judge Eckerle, affirmed. On a motion to modify, KRS 403.250 asks whether circumstances have changed so substantially and continuously that the existing terms have become unconscionable, meaning manifestly unfair or inequitable. The parties’ current finances mattered, and Judge Webb took them into account in reducing the award. The panel also read the 2019 agreement as expressly limiting when maintenance could end. Debra’s brief had a sharp line about Stephen’s request for more findings. She said he didn’t want additional findings, but “different one.”

Thomas M. Denbow represented Stephen on appeal. Ethan Chase and Juliana H. Reczek represented Debra.

Unreported. http://opinions.kycourts.net/COA/2026-CA-000116.PDF

D.R.B. v. D.C.B.; J.L.R.; J.L.R., a minor child; and M.M.B., 2026-CA-0292

In a case from Rockcastle County, a trial court entered an adoption by grandparents. In the adoption, the grandparents terminated the parental rights of their own adult daughter in order to adopt their grandchild.

The facts were bleak. The child was removed from the mother in 2020 and has lived with the grandparents since then. They filed the adoption action in 2024. By all accounts, the biological mother had a rough teenage period. Expelled from middle school for drugs. Running off to Texas with an abusive boyfriend at 17. Married, then divorced, then charged with crimes. (Editor’s note: One can’t help wondering if the grandparents didn’t do such a great job with Mom.)

By the adoption hearing, Mom showed signs of improvement. Parenting classes. A job with the Lexington Transit Authority. Steady housing.

Alas, it was a classic case of “too little, too late,” and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the adoption judgment. The panel concluded that the trial court judge was the proper person to weigh the parties’ credibility.

Jason A. Bowman represented Mom on appeal. Kimberly J. Olds represented the appellees.

Unreported. http://opinions.kycourts.net/COA/2026-CA-000292.PDF

Clara Hornbuckle v. Danielle Leto, 2026-CA-0732

We’re back in Lexington for another protective-order appeal. This one had video of a physical attack. The question was happened besides the attack.

Danielle and Clara had been friends. After Danielle asked for no further contact, Clara texted her from a different number. About four months late, Clara came up behind Danielle at work and dragged her backward several steps. Clara acknowledged sending the text and dragging Danielle. Danielle also testified that she thought she saw Clara drive past her apartment once, but gave little detail about that encounter. Judge Yahr counted the text and the attack as the two acts needed for stalking, treated the attack itself as an explicit threat, and entered a three-year interpersonal protective order.

Judge Cetrulo, joined by Judges Acree and Karem, agreed that the unprovoked attack could qualify as an explicit threat under the law governing the petition. The text was where the case came apart. It contained no threatening language, and the evidence did too little to show that the message and the attack formed a course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person substantial mental distress. Danielle also testified that she did not physically fear Clara and was more concerned about Clara’s ex-husband and associates. The panel vacated Judge Tiffany Yahr’s order.

Unreported. http://opinions.kycourts.net/COA/2026-CA-000732.PDF

Michael Joseph v. Shelby Joseph, 2026-CA-0735

A hearing notice came back marked “unable to forward.” Nine years later, Michael argued that the returned envelope should undo the latest extension of a domestic violence order. The Court of Appeals agreed that he missed his chance to be heard in 2017. It also held that he waited too long to act.

The original DVO dates to 2014. Shelby alleged that Michael assaulted her with a pistol, held her at gunpoint, and tattooed “SLUT” on her back. Not surprisingly, the Family Court entered a three-year no-contact order, then extended it in 2017, 2020, and 2023 on Shelby’s timely motions. In March 2026, Judge Hellard heard from both parties and extended it through March 31, 2029. She credited Shelby’s testimony that she still feared for her safety and found it telling that Shelby struggled even to be in the same room with Michael to ask for the extension. Michael’s efforts to reach out to Shelby’s family members also concerned her.

On appeal, Michael argued that the failed notice in 2017 deprived Family Court of personal jurisdiction. Judge Combs, joined by Judges Allison Jones and Moynahan, separated two questions that tend to get bundled together. The court had acquired jurisdiction over Michael when he was served in 2014, and the original DVO was still in effect when Shelby moved to extend it. The returned notice raised a due process problem because Michael had no opportunity to be heard at the 2017 hearing. But he did not move to set aside that extension, participated in later proceedings, and first raised the issue in June 2026. The panel held that he had waived the due process issue.

As for the latest extension, Cottrell v. Cotrell, 571 S.W.3d 590 (Ky. App. 2019), supplied the answer. A court can extend a DVO without proof of a new act of domestic violence. The absence of a new incident is one factor. Judge Hellard could also weigh the severity of the original conduct and Shelby’s testimony about why she still feared for her safety.

Unreported. http://opinions.kycourts.net/COA/2026-CA-000735.PDF

Thanks for reading! Click here to read the previous Round Up.

Cover Photo by Chris Haws on Unsplash.